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United States v. Dalton: Forcing Prosecutors to
Draw Their Weapons from a Different Holster
I.

INTRODUCTION

On the surface, United States v. Dalton 1 appears to be just
another double jeopardy case. Underlying the decision, however, tremendous practical ramifications affect prosecutors and
the tack they take in trying cases involving possession and
transfer of machine guns. If prosecutors choose to proceed under 26 U.S.C. § 5861 (Section 5861), 2 it is quite possible that
they will wind up reprosecuting under 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (Section 922 (o)).3 This double prosecution unduly burdens prosecu-

1 United States v. Dalton, 990 F.2d 1166 (lOth Cir. 1993).
2 26 U.S.C. § 5861 (1988). This section is part of what is known as the National Firearms Act, which includes §§ 5801-72. Section 5861 reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person(a) to engage in business as a manufacturer or importer of, or dealer
in, firearms without having paid the special (occupational) tax required by
section 5801 for his business or having registered as required by section
5802; or
(b) to receive or possess a firearm transferred to him in violation of
the provisions of this chapter; or
(c) to receive or possess a firearm made in violation of the provisions
of this chapter; or
(d) to receive or possess a firearm which is not registered to him in
the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record; or
(e) to transfer a firearm in violation of the provisions of this chapter;
or
(f) to make a firearm in violation of the provisions of this chapter; or
(g) to obliterate, remove, change, or alter the serial number or other
identification of a firearm required by this chapter; or
(h) to receive or possess a firearm having the serial number or other
identification required by this chapter obliterated, removed, changed or altered; or
(i) to receive or possess a firearm which is not identified by a serial
number as required by this chapter; or
(j) to transport, deliver, or receive any firearm in interstate commerce
which has not been registered as required by this chapter; or
(k) to receive or possess a firearm which has been imported or
brought into the United States in violation of section 5844; or
(!) to make, or cause the making of, a false entry on any application,
return, or record required by this chapter, knowing such entry to be false.

I d.
3 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (1988). This section was added to what is known as
the Gun Control Act, containing §§ 921-30, in 1986 in an amending act known as
the Firearms Owner's Protection Act, which reads:
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torial resources, which may be further taxed by the possibility
of past Section 5861 convictions reappearing in writs of habeas
corpus.
This Note thoroughly examines Dalton in both its reasoning and practical application. The split in circuits over the
constitutionality of Section 5861 will be discussed, followed by
an analysis of the relative advantages of Section 5861 and
Section 922(o) and suggestions on how prosecutors can decide
under which statute to proceed. There will also be some discussion of potential policy rationale behind the Dalton decision.
II. FACTS AND BACKGROUND-TRACING DALTON THROUGH
THE SYSTEM

John Dalton, an attorney, had a client who was a registered gun dealer. As payment for his services, he accepted a
firearm which had been converted into a machine gun in 1989.
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado
convicted Dalton of violating Sections 5861(d) and (e) of the
National Firearms Act: Subsection (d) prohibits receipt or possession of an unregistered firearm; Subsection (e) prohibits the
transfer of a firearm without compliance with the transfer
provision in Section 5812 (which requires the transferor to see
that the firearm is registered to the transferee and the transfer
tax is paid). 4
Dalton appealed his conviction, claiming he had been
asked to perform an impossible act. In 1986, Section 922(o) was
added to the Gun Control Act of 1968, making it illegal to possess any machine gun made after 1986. The government does
not allow registration of machine guns falling under Section
922(o) and does not accept the tax which would be required
under the National Firearms Act. 5 In fact, Section 5812 states
specifically that an application for registration will be denied if

(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), it shall be unlawful for any per·
son to transfer or possess a machinegun.
(2) This subsection does not apply with respect to(A) a transfer to or by, or possession by or under the authority of, the
United States or any department or agency thereof or a State, or a de·
partment, agency, or political subdivision thereof; or
(B) any lawful transfer or lawful possession of a machinegun that was
lawfully possessed before the date this subsection takes effect.

I d.
4 United States v. Dalton, 960 F.2d 121, 122 (loth Cir. 1993).
5 Id.
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transfer, receipt, or possession of the firearm would violate the
law. 6 Dalton argued that requiring him to perform an act
which was precluded by law violated both due process and
fundamental fairness. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit agreed with Dalton and reversed the decision
of the district court, holding that Section 5861 violated Dalton's
due process rights. 7
Dalton was reindicted under Section 922(o). He made a
motion to dismiss the indictment. Dalton argued that the new
indictment violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment8 because his previous conviction under Section
5861 had stemmed from the identical act. The United States
District Court for the District of Colorado granted Dalton's
motion to dismiss, agreeing with his double jeopardy argument.9
The government appealed the dismissal. This time the
court of appeals reversed the district court in favor of the government. The court declared that Dalton's reprosecution under
Section 922(o) was not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause.
The case was remanded with instructions that the indictment
be reinstated. 10

Ill. THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S REASONING IN Dalton
Dalton's double jeopardy argument, which was accepted by
the district court, was based on the standard double jeopardy
tests outlined by the U.S. Supreme Court in Blockburger v.
United States 11 and Grady v. Corbin. 12 The court of appeals,

6 United States v. Kurt, 988 F.2d 73 (9th Cir. 1993).
7 Dalton, 960 F.2d at 126.
8 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
9 United States v. Dalton, 795 F. Supp. 353, 356 (D. Colo. 1992).
10 Dalton, 990 F.2d at 1166-68. Regarding this decision, the United States
Supreme Court denied certiorari on October 4, 1993. Dalton v. United States, 114
S. Ct. 253 (1993).
11 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
12 495 U.S. 508 (1990). The double jeopardy test in Blockburger is known as
the "same elements" test. In order to pass this test, each of the two offenses in
question must require proof of an essential element which is not required to prove
the other offense. If this test is passed, then the "same conduct" test in Grady is
applied. This test provides a double jeopardy bar to prosecution "if, to establish an
essential element of an offense charged in that prosecution, the government will
prove conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has already been
prosecuted." Grady, 495 U.S. at 510.
In Dalton, the district court found that the two offenses failed the Blockburger
test, and thus an analysis under the more inclusive Grady test was not undertak-
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however, entertained very little of the district court's analysis.
Instead, the court skirted these cases and demonstrated that
judicially crafted exceptions to general double jeopardy
principles applied to the facts in Dalton. The court stated:
It has long been settled, however, that the Double Jeopardy
Clause's general prohibition against successive prosecutions
does not prevent the government from retrying a defendant
who succeeds in getting his first conviction set aside, through
direct appeal or collateral attack, because of some error in the
proceedings leading to the conviction. 13

The court then analogized Dalton to Montana v. Hall, 14 a case
where the statute under which the defendant had been prosecuted did not take effect until three months after he committed
his illegal act. In Hall, the United States Supreme Court said
that the state had "simply relied on the wrong statute," and
"[i]t is clear that the Constitution permits retrial after a conviction is reversed because of a defect in the charging instrument."15 The court of appeals found that "[Dalton] is virtually
indistinguishable from Hall," 16 pointing out that the charging
instrument, Section 5861, had been implicitly repealed after
the conviction and was thus defective. Therefore, under the
rule set forth in Hall, Dalton's reprosecution under Section
922(o) did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. 17
IV. ANALYSIS

A. Is the Double Jeopardy Analysis in Dalton Valid?
Given the district court's analysis under the mainstream
double jeopardy cases of Blockburger and Grady, it follows that
the court of appeals needed substantial grounds to overturn its
ruling. The court met this burden by relying on Supreme Court
cases such as Hall, which carve out exceptions to the general
double jeopardy rules. The strength of their argument is best

en by the court. This is significant because, for those courts which may agree with
the double jeopardy analysis of the district court, the recent overruling of Grady by
United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2852 (1993), does not affect their analysis.
13 Dalton, 990 F.2d at 1168 (quoting Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 38
(1988)).
14 481 u.s. 400 (1987).
15 Dalton, 990 F.2d at 1168 (quoting Hall, 481 U.S. at 404).
16 ld.
17 !d.
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demonstrated, however, by exposing the weaknesses of the
arguments put forth by the district court.
Since the government's case in Dalton was based on specific exceptions to the double jeopardy rules, in order to effectively
discount the government's claims and rely on mainstream double jeopardy analysis the district court needed to show that the
exceptions did not apply to the facts in Dalton. The district
court failed to do this. The court correctly pointed out that if a
conviction is reversed for insufficiency of evidence,
reprosecution is not proper. The court then reasoned, however,
that since Dalton "was convicted of a crime he could not perform," that "the evidence was necessarily insufficient." 18 This
is logically unsound. The evidence presented was more than
sufficient to prove that Dalton was indeed in possession of an
unregistered machine gun, which is unarguably a crime under
Section 5861. The problem is with the statute itself, not the
evidence. The court of appeals effectively refuted this argument
by the district court. 19
Mter presenting this faulty reasoning, the district court
then decided that it really was not necessary because, it subsequently claimed, Dalton "raises double jeopardy issues independent of those which arise after a conviction is reversed on appeal."20 The court compared Brown v. Ohio,21 claiming it was
a similar case which raised the same issues. 22 This analysis,
however, is also flawed. The comparison was based on the
statement: "courts may not impose more than one punishment
for the same offense and prosecutors ordinarily may not attempt to secure that punishment in more than one trial."23
The district court relied on footnote five to this statement,
which reads in part, "[w]e are not concerned here with the
double jeopardy questions that may arise ... after a conviction
is reversed on appeal." 24 In Brown v. Ohio, Brown was convicted on one charge, actually served his sentence, and then

18 United States v. Dalton, 795 F. Supp. 353, 356 (D. Colo. 1992).
19 Dalton, 990 F.2d at 1168.
20 Dalton, 795 F. Supp. at 356.
21 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977) (holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred
Brown's prosecution for auto theft after he had already been prosecuted and punished for the lesser included offense of operating the vehicle without the owner's
consent).
22 Dalton, 795 F. Supp at 356.
23 Brown, 432 U.S. at 165 (emphasis added).
24 ld. at 165 n.5.
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was being reprosecuted for another crime of which his previous
conviction was a lesser included offense. The reason the Supreme Court did not look at the question addressed in the footnote is because it was inapplicable to the facts of Brown since
his conviction was not reversed on appeal. The double jeopardy
question mentioned in the footnote applies to Dalton, however,
since Dalton's first conviction under Section 5861 was reversed
on appeal. Looking at the Court's textual statement, it is evident that it was indicating, through the use of the word "ordinarily" and the subsequent footnote, that there are possible
exceptions to the general rule, particularly in the circumstances
outlined in the footnote. The district court misinterpreted these
exceptions. Although the appellate court never addressed this
particular flaw in the district court's opinion, viewed correctly
it actually strengthens the court of appeals' position on reversal.
Finally, the district court claimed that Hall recognizes
"that where Blockburger double jeopardy issues are implicated
the rule allowing reprosecutions after a reversal on grounds
other than insufficiency of the evidence is inapplicable."25 This
language in Hall 26 appears in a footnote to the statement:
"[b]ut the Brown analysis is not apposite in this [Hall] case,"27
and the footnote reads "[w ]e explicitly noted in Brown that the
case did not raise 'the double jeopardy questions that may arise
... after a conviction is reversed on appeal."'28
In context, the district court's final argument in Dalton
was merely an extension of its previous misinterpretation of
Brown, lending further consistency to the appellate court's
analysis in Dalton. So although the Court of Appeals did not
extensively dismantle the district court's opinion, it is clear
that the interplay of double jeopardy rules and Supreme Courtcreated exceptions supported the reversal of the district court.

B. Is Section 5861 Really Unconstitutional?

1. The Tenth Circuit says yes
In Dalton's original appeal of his conviction under Section
5861, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals referred to United

25
26
27
28

Dalton, 795 F. Supp. at 356.
Montana v. Hall, 481 U.S. 400, 404 n.2 (1987).

ld. at 404.
!d. at 404 n.2 (quoting Brown, 432 U.S. at 165 n.5).
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States u. Rock Island Armory,29 Sonzinsky u. United States,30
and the legislative history of the National Firearms Act in
order to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of this section.
Central to the court's reasoning was the taxing purpose behind
the statute. When Congress passed the National Firearms Act,
it chose to go about regulating the making, sale, possession,
and transfer of machine guns through the taxing power granted it by the Constitution. The primary reason for this was to
avoid improper use of congressional power to regulate what
could be considered a local activity and thus within the power
of the states to regulate.
In Sonzinsky, the regulatory purpose of the National Firearms Act was challenged on these basic grounds, claiming that
the tax was unconstitutional since it was, in reality, a penalty
imposed to aid regulation of machine gun trafficking. The Supreme Court rejected this challenge, claiming that the registration provisions were supportable as a means of generating
revenue and stating that, "[o]n its face, it is only a taxing measure."31
In Rock Island Armory:
[T]he court pointed out that this Act was passed and has been
consistently upheld under the power of Congress to raise
revenue. The court reasoned that because the possession of
machineguns made after 1986 is illegal under section 922(o)
and the government will therefore no longer register and tax
them, and because the registration requirements are solely in
aid of collecting the tax, the constitutional base for those requirements-i.e., the power to tax-has disappeared. Accordingly, the court held the registration requirements constitutionally invalid as to firearms that the government no longer
taxes. 32

The Tenth Circuit adopted this position in Dalton's first appeal,
declaring that Section 922(o), as added to the Gun Control Act,
does indeed render Section 5861 of the National Firearms Act
constitutionally invalid for the reasons stated in Rock Island
Armory. "To put the proposition as plainly as we are able: a
provision which is passed as an exercise of the taxing power no

29 773 F. Supp. 117 (C.D. Ill. 1991).
30 300 U.S. 506 (1937).
31 United States v. Dalton, 960 F.2d 121, 124-25 (lOth Cir. 1993) (quoting
Sonzinsky, 300 U.S. at 513).
32 ld.
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longer has that constitutional basis when Congress decrees
that the subject of that provision can no longer be taxed."33

2. The Fourth and Seventh Circuits say no
The Fourth Circuit rejected the Dalton reasoning in United
States v. Jones. 34 Jones was convicted of possessing, transferring, and transporting in interstate commerce two shotguns
which he had modified into automatic weapons and sold to
undercover government agents. He was convicted under the
National Firearms Act. Part of his appeal relied on Dalton and
the assertion that the government should have tried him under
the Gun Control Act instead. In rejecting Jones' argument, the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned: "In the absence of
some affirmative showing of an intention to repeal, the only
permissible justification for repeal by implication is when the
earlier and later statutes are irreconcilable."35 The court
pointed out that no affirmative showing of an intent to repeal
the National Firearms Act appears in either the statutory text
or the legislative history of the 1986 amendment to the Gun
Control Act. Absent such showing, the two statutes must be
examined for irreconcilability. The court reasoned that the two
statutes are not irreconcilable because "neither act requires
him to deal in such guns. Simply put, Jones can comply with
both acts by refusing to deal in newly-made machine guns."36
The Fourth Circuit also rejected the reasoning in Dalton
concerning the inapplicability of the taxing provision. It pointed
out that the government still taxes the making of illegal machine guns even though possession and transfer are not
taxed. 37 While the Dalton court claimed that taxing the making of machine guns is irrelevant to prosecution of possessing
and transferring, the court maintained that knowing the chain
of possession and transfer helps to determine the maker of the
firearm and is thus "supportable as in aid of a revenue purpose."38 In addition, the court pointed to Minor v. United
States 39 to support its claim that, even if the power to tax
33 !d. at 125.
34 976 F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1992).
35 !d. at 183 (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550 (1974)).
36 Jones, 976 F.2d at 183.
37 !d.; see also Dalton, 960 F.2d at 125.
38 Jones, 976 F.2d at 184 (quoting Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506,
513 (1937)).
39 396 U.S. 87, 98 (1969).
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were no longer sufficient to support the statute, Congress' power under the Commerce Clause would certainly be sufficient to
support it in Jones' case. 40
The Seventh Circuit, in United States u. Ross, 41 rejected
Dalton and adopted the analysis set forth in Jones. Since Rock
Island Arnwry was decided by the Central District Court of
Illinois, which is contained within the Seventh Circuit, its holding appears to be overruled by Ross. While the Seventh Circuit
never expressed this intention, it did mention that Jones rejects both Rock Island Armory and Dalton.

3.

The Ninth Circuit is unclear

The Ninth Circuit, in United States u. Kurt, 42 noted with
favor the reasoning in Dalton. 43 In Kurt, the Ninth Circuit
quoted heavily from Dalton but then stated that it "need not
resolve the question of whether Kurt could have been convicted
under [Section] 5861 if he was in possession of a gun which
had been purchased or converted after May 19, 1986, since he
has failed to show that [Section] 5861 is unconstitutional in its
application to him."44 The court then said that since Kurt had
not presented evidence demonstrating when the gun was either
purchased or converted, he had not carried the burden necessary to establish the unconstitutionality of the statute. 45
While the Ninth Circuit did not expressly find Section 5861
unconstitutional, the court's extensive reliance on the analysis
in Dalton seems to indicate that, given the right case, it would
follow Dalton.
This apparent leaning by the court of appeals did not sway
the district court for the Central District of California in United
States u. O'Mara. 46 In this case O'Mara was convicted under
Section 5861(d) of possession of an unregistered machine gun.
Subsequently, he filed a writ of habeas corpus in which he
moved to have his sentence vacated. The district court in
O'Mara seized upon the fact that Kurt did not expressly decide
the constitutionality of Section 5861 convictions because Kurt

40
41
42
43
44
45
46

Jones, 976 F.2d at 183-84.
9 F.3d 1182, 1192-94 (7th Cir. 1993).
988 F.2d 73 (9th Cir. 1993).
United States v. Dalton, 960 F.2d 121 (lOth Cir. 1993).
Kurt, 988 F.2d at 75-76.
Id. at 76.
827 F. Supp. 1468 (C.D. Cal. 1993).
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was not clearly subject to Section 922(o). It pointed out that
O'Mara was subject to Section 922(o) and then proceeded to
demonstrate the flaws in the Dalton analysis. 47
The district court argued persuasively that, due to the
1968 amendment of the National Firearms Act, the transferee
is exempt from the statute's registration requirement. Because
of this, the court stated: "the NFA creates a single mandate for
the transferee of the firearm. It prohibits him from accepting
possession of a firearm that has not been properly registered by
the transferor."48 This reading supports the Jones analysis by
demonstrating that both statutes can be complied with if the
transferee merely refuses to take possession of the unregistered
machine gun. 49
The district court also attacked the assumption in Dalton
that the sole constitutional basis of Section 5861 was the taxing power, pointing out that in United States v. Evans, 50 "[t]he
Ninth Circuit holds that section 5861(d) is a valid exercise of
the authority vested in Congress by the commerce clause."51
This reasoning demonstrated that, even if the taxing provision
is of no purpose after the enactment of Section 922(o), there is
still a valid constitutional underpinning for Section 5861.
The juxtaposition of the dicta in the Kurt case against the
well-reasoned O'Mara district court opinion makes it unclear
which path the Ninth Circuit will choose to follow on this issue.
Thus the circuits are split concerning the constitutionality of
the National Firearms Act, with the Fourth and Seventh Circuit going one direction, the Tenth Circuit the other direction,
and the Ninth Circuit in a state of flux. While a thorough analysis of the viability of these divergent opinions is beyond the
scope of this Note, it should be evident that the unstable state
of the NFA provides federal prosecutors quite a tightrope to
walk, especially in the jurisdictions which have yet to address
the issue.

47 !d. at 1470-72.
48 !d. at 1471.
49 Nevertheless, the district court in O'Mara notes that this analysis would
not apply to a transferor of firearms, since they are required to register the firearms under the amended NFA. !d. at 1471 n.l2. They point out that the defendant in Jones was a maker of firearms, and thus the Jones analysis was erroneously applied in that case.
50 928 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1991).
51 O'Mara, 827 F. Supp. at 1472.

477]

UNITED STATES V. DALTON

487

C. How Can Prosecutors Decide Which Statute to Use?
In helping prosecutors decide under which statute to indict, the question which must logically be asked now is: What
are the advantages to indictment under Section 5861 as opposed to Section 922(o)? In addressing this question, we will
put aside the issue of taxation, assuming that the primary
purpose of both statutes is to regulate the trafficking of firearms. To begin with, sentencing does not appear to be an issue.
There is no distinction within the Sentencing Guidelines which
would result in differing sentences according to the statute
under which the charge came. 52
Looking at the statutory language, Section 5861 is applicable to "firearms,"53 whereas Section 922(o) is applicable only
to "machineguns."54 The definition of a machine gun is the
same in Section 922 as it is in Section 5845 of the National
Firearms Act,55 but the definition of firearm under Section
5845 is much broader. 56 This obviously makes Section 5861

52 See SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 2K2.1 (1993).
53 See 26 U.S.C. § 5861, supra note 2.
54 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), supra note 3.
55 See 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(4). The definition in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b) reads:
The term "machinegun" means any weapon which shoots, is designed to
shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one
shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger. The
term shall also include the frame or receiver of any such weapon, any
part designed and intended solely and exclusively, or combination of parts
designed and intended, for use in converting a weapon into a
machinegun, and any combination of parts from which a machinegun can
be assembled if such parts are in the possession or under the control of a
person.
56 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a) reads:
The term "firearm" means (1) a shotgun having a barrel or barrels of less
than 18 inches in length; (2) a weapon made from a shotgun if such
weapon as modified has an overall length of less than 26 inches or a
barrel or barrels of less than 18 inches in length; (3) a rifle having a
barrel or barrels of less than 16 inches in length; (4) a weapon made
from a rifle if such weapon as modified has an overall length of less than
26 inches or a barrel or barrels of less than 16 inches in length; (5) any
other weapon, as defined in subsection (e); (6) a machinegun; (7) any
silencer (as defmed in section 921 of title 18, United States Code); and
(8) a destructive device. The term "firearm" shall not include an antique
firearm or any device (other than a machinegun or destructive device)
which, although redesigned as a weapon, the Secretary finds by reason of
the date of its manufacture, value, design, and other characteristics is
primarily a collector's item and is not likely to be used as a weapon.
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broader in its reach, but the types of firearms listed other than
machine guns can still be validly controlled under Section
586-even if it is considered unconstitutional with respect to
machine guns-because it was Section 922(o) which rendered
Section 5861 unconstitutional. In other words, since Section
922(o) is only applicable to possession and transfer of machine
guns, it can only invalidate Section 5861 with respect to possession and transfer of machine guns.
It is not apparent anywhere that Section 922(o) is in any
way inferior to Section 5861 with regard to the regulatory effect it has on possession and transfer of machine guns. Thus,
prosecutors have the same statutory weapons they had originally under Section 5861, but some of them are now drawn
from a different statutory holster. Mter determining there is no
advantage to indictment under either statute, how does a prosecutor decide under which statute to indict? The answer is
obviously dependent on the jurisdiction. Prosecutors in the
Fourth and Seventh Circuits appear to be safe to use either
statute in a possession and transfer case considering the holdings in Jones and Ross. Prosecutors in the Tenth Circuit should
certainly use Section 922(o) for such cases, and, given the uncertainty in the Ninth Circuit, Section 922(o) seems the safer
route for prosecutors there as well.
As far as the open jurisdictions are concerned, it is a judgment call. Prosecutors would obviously prefer that the rationale
of the Jones court be adopted, thus giving them license to indict
under either statute according to any preference they may
have. Given the right fact situation, if a prosecutor saw indicators that their circuit preferred the Jones analysis, they might
want to test the court. The risks probably outnumber the potential benefits, however. If the court in a particular jurisdiction adopts the Dalton analysis, the prosecutor must go back
and reindict under Section 922(o), taking the case through the
system again. There are no guarantees that the court will allow
this. The court may instead adopt the double jeopardy analysis
of the District of Colorado District Court (although it was overruled), barring reprosecution completely. The Ninth Circuit,
albeit prior to the second Dalton ruling by the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals, indicated in dicta at the end of Kurt that
such reindictment would be barred by the Double Jeopardy
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Clause. 57 Even if the court allows reindictment and
reprosecution, the attempt under Section 5861 has resulted in
a waste of time and resources which could have been avoided
had the original indictment been under Section 922(o). Since
there are no evident benefits of Section 5861 over Section
922(o), it is apparent that initial indictment under Section
922(o) is both the safe and efficient choice for virtually all circuits.

D. Potential Policy Reasons for the Dalton Decision
While the Dalton analysis is grounded on sound double
jeopardy principles, some practical effects of the decision may
have played a part in the court's decision.

1.

Judicial economy

Had the Dalton court decided differently, the decision could
have opened for prosecutors a whole new Pandora's box. With
post-1986 convictions under Section 5861 for possession and
transfer considered constitutionally infirm in the Tenth Circuit,
writs of habeas corpus could become an option for inmates
serving time under such convictions. With no way to reindict
these individuals, it could become an increasingly exercised option, causing a caseload increase for already overburdened
prosecutors. However, with the likelihood that a successful writ
of habeas corpus will be followed by a valid reindictment under
Section 922(o), this option will probably not be nearly as attractive to inmates.

2.

Public policy requires punishment of the guilty

A second very practical consideration is that of punishment
for the guilty. Many people, especially outside of the legal community, express continual frustration at seeing convicted criminals turned loose on technicalities. The Dalton decision insures
that prosecutors still have a weapon to use against guilty parties whose convictions are invalid due to the unconstitutionality
of the statute under which they were convicted. Thus, the public policy requiring that those individuals guilty of a crime be
punished is furthered in the Tenth Circuit by Dalton.

57 United States v. Kurt, 988 F.2d 73, 76 (9th Cir. 1993).
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CONCLUSION

The double jeopardy analysis in Dalton has significant
ramifications for prosecutors. It affords them the ability to
reprosecute individuals under a valid statute if the statute
under which the prior conviction was obtained is found to be
unconstitutional. This decision also raises practical issues for
prosecutors which must be considered, the greatest of which is
whether to pursue prosecution of an individual accused of possession and transfer of a machine gun under Section 5861 or
Section 922(o). Since both statutes serve the same regulatory
function, without any perceived advantages to either, Section
922(o) affords prosecutors the path of least resistance and
greatest efficiency, and should be used accordingly.

Benton Larsen

